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theory strange
REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN
Introduction
Diplomats often find international relations (IR) books strange. If
they read - or more likely reread (as many Western diplomats have
studied IR theory at some point of their life) - Waltz's Theory of
International Politics/ they shake their heads. When presented with
metaphors of the state such as Wolfers's2 famous billiard ball: "a
closed, impermeable, and sovereign unit, completely separated from
all other states," they look bewildered. Also non-realist IR scholar-
ship appears odd to most diplomats. Finnemore and Sikkink's life
cycle of norms3 would seem as far from their daily work tasks as
Jervis's game theoretical models of cooperation and conflict under
anarchy.4 Diplomats would anytime prefer the gossip in their
embassy cables and the Financial Times (FT) to the models in
International Organizatiol1 or International Studies Quarterly. Not
just because cables and FTprovidea lighter read but also because they
seem closer to what diplomats perceive as the "real world." What lies
behind this estrangement between diplomats and scholars of interna-
tional relations?
I wish to thank Iver B.Neumann, Vincent Pouliot, Ole Jacob Sending, and the other
participants at the workshop at the New School for Social Research in September
2012 for their helpful ideas and comments. Moreover, I am grateful to the anon-
ymous reviewers as well as to Julia Frohneberg,j.ene Hansen, and Cynthia Weber
for constructive suggestions.
1 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of Ill1ernational Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
2 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1962), 19.
3 Martha Finnemore and Kahtryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change," International Organization, 52(4), 1988.
4 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, 3(2),
1978.
284
Conclusion 285
Scholars in diplomatic studies have argued that the reason for the
estrangement is to be found within IR theory itself. It is "dangerously
reductionist,"S "rationalistic,,,6 focusing on macro decisions of super-
powers,? or simply irrelevant - "locked within the circle of esoteric
scholarly discussion" as US diplomat David D. Newson put it.s
Arguably, IR theory has failed to acknowledge the logic of practice in
diplomacy,9 and it does not capture the bodily experience to being a
diplomat.1o However, the authors of the preceding chapters have
demonstrated that the problem is more fundamental: IR scholars
have ignored that diplomacy helps constitute world politics. To'bring
out the ways in which this constitution takes place, the ehapter-tl-ffi this
book ha¥il employed a relational approach.
In this conclusion, which reflects critically on this approach and its
wider consequences, I argue that diploma ts are estranged from IR theory-
and vice versa - because IR scholars generally subscribe to substantia/ism,
whereas diplomats tend to think in terms of relations. In fact, a deeper
understanding of these relations is a key theoretical take-away point of
this book. More specifically, the ehaj'lte'i.argues that relationalism - as a
meta-theoretical approach - not only helps us understand the diplomatic
production of world politics, relationalism also reflects a particular
ontology, which differs fundamentally from the worldview that most
IR scholars subscribe to. As I suggest, most IR s~holars depart from the
social phenomenon they want to study, for example, states, diplomats,
soldiers, organizations, treaties, companies, and women.ll Assuming a
s Carne Ross, Independem Diplomat: Dispatches from all Unaccountable Elite
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 146.
6 Harald Muller, "Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action,
Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International
Relations," European foumal of Imemational Relations, 10(3),2004;
Jeffrey Lewis, "The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision
Making in the European Union," International Orgallization, 59(4), 2005.
7 Geoffrey Wiseman, "Bringing Diplomacy Back In: Time for Theory to Catch Up
with Practice," Illtemational Studies Perspectives, 12(4), 2011.
8 Newson (2001) quoted in Stephen Walt, "The Relationship between Theory and
Policy in International Relations," Allnual Review Political Science, 8, 2005, 24.
9 Vincent Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security
Communities," International Organization, 62(2), 2008.
10 Iver B. Neumann, "To Be a pipJomat," international Studies Perspectives, 6(1),
2005.
11 See also Patrick J. Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, "Relations before States:
Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics," European fOllmal of
Internatiollal Relations, 5(3), 1999.
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priori the existence of these phenomena (e.g. states or individuals) and
ascribing certain characteristics to them, they develop substantive the-
ories. Consequently, diplomacy is reduced to the mechanics of states
bumping into each other or a system of reciprocal signaling.
However, most diplomats know, in an embodied but often unarti-
culated sense, that world politics is deeply relational. Their job is to
make those relations "work," and they are convinced that important
knowledge can be gained by consulting and meeting with foreign
powers, that is, "the other." As such, they subscribe to a relational
thinking (shared to some extent by diplomatic scholars). Relationalism
takes as its point of departure the idea that social phenomena making
up world politics always develop in relation to other social phenom-
ena. Thus, for example, states are not born into' this world as fully
developed states that then "exist"; states are made in continuous
relations with other states and non-state actors. The development,
consolidation, weakening (or even disappearance) of states can only
be understood in terms of continuous processes that play out in rela-
tion to other social processes. These ontological and epistemological
differences between much of IR scholarship and diplomatic knowledge
and practice are important for how we understand (and construct)
world politics, including war, international cooperation, and
responses to human and natural catastrophes.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section illustrates
diplomats' relational ontology and construction of national interests
with an anecdote from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an
account from a former US ambassador to France. The third section
shows that substantialism may be part of the reason why IR theory, in
its realist, liberalist, and constructivist versions, has produced reduc-
tionist images of diplomacy. Addressing this problem, the fourth section
teases out the relational approach, which is advanced in this book,
whereby diplomacy is seen as constitutive (or rather co-constitutive)
of other international or transnational practices. The fifth and sixth
sections examine the problems and limits of the relational approach
adopted in this book, which still insists that diplomacy is the mediation
of estrangement: first, the risk of down playing the consequences of
diplomacy's move from representation toward governance and second
and the risk of seeing diplomacy as politically "empty" (and thus
innocent) practice that can be addressed separately from questions of
power. The chapter concludes that if IR theory is to begin closing the
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gap between the theory and practice of world politics, as scholars such
as Walt have called for,12 it will need to acknowledge other forms
of knowledge than the substantia list version dominating political
science today.
Diplomacy as "folk re1ationalism": we would never.
talk about "win-sets" .
The first argument that I wish to make, drawing on the preceding
chapters, is that the diplomatic worldview differs from that of IR
scholars. This helps explain their mutual estrangement. More specifi-
cally, many IR scholars have a substantialist view of world politics,
whereas many diplomats subscribe to "folk relationalism.',13 By "folk
relational ism, " I understand the commonsensical way of carving up the
social world in what the anthropologists Ladislav Holy and Milan
Stuchlik call "folk models," that is, people's representations of their
own world - srylized schemata of social facts, ideas of relations and
social causes that people work' by in their everyday lives. They are
learned or experienced assumptions about ho:w the world works that
help navigate social relationships, conflicts, and needs that they have in
ordinary life.14 Diplomatic action, as I will show, also proceeds based
on a particular representation of the world. This has important impli-
cations for the construction of national interests, as the following
example illustrates.
When I was working as a head of section in the Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA; 20l0-ll), I once showed an academic article on
EU foreign policy toa colleague. I was employed full time at the MFA,
but I continued to. teach the IR undergraduate course at the university,
and I was interested in my colleagues thoughts on the article, which
was on the students' reading list. My colleague, who was responsible
for EU foreign policy coordination in the MFA, read it. In the lunch
canteen, he said: "It's too bad your students never learn how diplomacy
really works." "What do you mean?," 1asked. He answered, "I mean
this is so far from realiry. We would never talk about 'win-sets' ... You
12 Walt, "The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International
Relations. "
13 I thank the editors for this formulation.
14 See also Iver B.Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, "The 'International' as
Governmentality," Millennium.Journal of International Studies, 35(3), 680.
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know how Michael [our head of department] likes to put it: 'it's about
being within target,''' my colleague saidY In the course of my stint at
the MFA, I learned that "being within target" was extremely difficult to
pin down in words. It was not always based on a calculation of interest,
but more a gut feeling. You knew when it sounded right, when you had
described our national position in the right terms.
Of course, my colleague's criticism of the article may just reflect his
self-construction or professional identity.16 For instance, few people
think about their choice between two supermarkets as related to their
indifference curves. Yet, economists have effectively demonstrated
that - as abstract and idealized as they may be - indifference curves
actually provide an accurate description of consumer behavior. So
perhaps my colleague, the diplomat, did not know himself well enough.
My colleague, however, insisted that this was not the case. He leaned
over and said, "the problem is that he [the scholar] believes that
national interests are fixed prior to negotiations. But we always keep
brackets. "
With "we always keep brackets," my colleague referred to the way
we drafted the national position and speech notes for the foreign or
prime minister. While the MFA would collect background material
weeks ahead of the meetings in Brussels, the paragraph explicating
the national position and bullet points for the minister were often
kept in brackets or left blank until the very last hours before a
meeting.1?
This anecdote suggests that diplomats think in terms of processes
and relations rather than substances. Diplomats know that interna-
tional negotiations require a certain degree of flexibility and adaption
of national positions. As Sending shows in Chapter 9, they draw on
intuitive flairs or social skills that help them steer the negotiations in the
15 "Det handler om at vcere inden for skillen" in Danish.
16 For fascinating analyses of diplomatic scripts and reflectivity, see Neumann,
"To Be a Diplomat"; Ivcr B. Neumann, "'A Speech That the Entire Ministry
May Stand £or,"or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New,"
International Political Sociology, 1(2),2007; Costas M. Constantinou,
"Between Statecraft and Humanism: Diplomacy and Its Forms of Knowledge,"
International Studies Review, 15(2),2013.
17 This is an interesting parallel to Neumann's observation that keeping brackets as
a way of wielding influence (Iver B.Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats:
Itlside a European Foreign Ministry [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2012J, 114).
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preferred direction. Of course, some negotiations are based on clearly
formulated and fixed goals such as security partnerships, trade rounds,
or membership accession agreements, but even such negotiations
require a certain degree of subtleness in terms of presentation of posi-
tions, timing, and an ability to make compromises. Moreover, national
interests may change in the course of the negotiation process as the
involved parties learn more about the issue and their opponents and as
the negotiations gain their own momentum.
This ever-changing nature of national positions has been accepted to
some degree in the bargaining literature. For instance, two-level game
approaches acknowledge that domestic politics affects diplomacy
continuously. Putnam even admits that
formally speaking, game-theoretic analysis requires that the structure of
issues and payoffs be specified in advance. In reality, however, much of
what happens in any bargaining situation involves attempts by the players
to restructure the game and to alter one another's perceptions of the costs
of no-agreement and the benefits of proposed agreement. IS
Yet Putnam (and others) still -assumes that there is such a thing as a
national win-set. Putnam needs a priori assumptions and win-sets to
make his theory work. In many occasions, however, a negotiation has
no clear beginning. This was also the case one century ago. The seasoned
diplomat Henry White, reflecting on his experience as US ambassador to
France (1906-9) and as representative of the United States at a range of
international conferences from the 1880s to the 1910s, explains how
negotiations often start with vague ideas. For instance, the International
Agriculture Conference, held in Rome in 1905,
assembled not only with a very vague idea as to what shape, if any, its labors
would assume, but with a strong conviction on the part of a majority of the
delegates that no result at all was likely to be attained, beyond perhaps a
demonstration of good will to the Italian sovereign and nation.19
However, as a result of the "zeal and tact of the very able men compos-
ing the Italian delegation, encouragement and interest took place of
18 RobertD. Putnam, "Diplomacyand DomesticPolitics:TheLogicofTwo-Level
Games," Illternational Orga>/izatioll,42(3),1988: 454, myitalics.AsPutnam
writes, "much ambassadorial action ... has precisely this function" (ibid.).
19 HenryWhireer aI., "The Organizationand Procedureof rheThird Hague
Conference," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its
AnnualMeering,6, 1912, 182.
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skepticism and apathy.,,20 In the end, the negotiations led to the shar-
ing of information on agricultural products and the establishments of
agricultural bureaus across much of the Western world. Diplomacy, in
other words, helped construct the national interest, not just represent
it. How did IR scholars come to believe in (or felt a need to assume) a
pre-given national interest or win-set that determines negotiations?
Bumping billiard balls and signals: two images
of diplomacy in IR theory
To get at the core of the problem with most accounts of diplomacy (and
why my colleague could not recognize himself in the academic article),
we need to address the substantialist thinking inherent in much IR
theory. I build here on Mustafa Emirbayer's distinction between
substantialist and relational social theoryY Within IR, Emirbayer's
relational manifesto has influenced Jackson and Nexon's argument
about the processual character of world politics,22 leading them to
argue - as diplomats would do - that relations come before states.23
This brief section cannot do justice to the nuances and sophistication
of the different IR theories; instead, it will point to a few basic assump-
tions that have limited IR scholars' view of diplomacy.
Substantialism dominates much of social science and in particular IR
theory. It claims that substances (things, beings, entities, essences) are
the "units" or "levels" of analysis and that they exist prior to the
analysis. Emirbayer uses Norbert Elias to trace the analytical fondness
for substances (things, beings, essences) back to the grammar of
Western languages.24 One example is the wind, "the wind is blowing."
20 Ibid.
21 Mustafa Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology," American/oumal
ofSociolog)', 103(2), 1997,283.
22 Jackson and Nexon, "Relations before States."
23 With a different purpose, Albert et al. have argued that large-scale change is only
intelligible with a relational ontology, and Guillaume has constructed a
relational-dialogical approach to provide a more nuanced understanding of
subjectivity and the development of national identities. SeeMathias Albert,
David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid, eds., Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking
bttemationa1 Relations Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2011); and Xavier Guillaume, "Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity: A
Dialogical Understanding ofInternational Relations," Millennium, 31(1), 2002.
24 Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology," 283.
Conclusion 291
"We speak as if the wind were separate from its blowing, as if a wind
could exist which did not blow. ,,25
The idea of that a state has (i.e., possesses) a particular national
interest as mentioned earlier, is illustrative of IR's substantialism.
In a constructivist version that interest is socially constructed, yet at
the most fundamental level - "before interaction" - it is the desire
to survive that drives states.26 However, as poststructuralist and
feminist IR scholars have demonstrated,27 while one may show that
the state is partially a social construction as Wendt does, many of
the processes that construct the state as a subject - including
diplomacy - will be left out of the analysis when the essentialist
ontology sneaks in.
Self-action: diplomacy as states bumping into each other
According to Emirbayer, there are two substantialist positions: "self-
action" and "inter-action." Following a self-action perspective, things
are "acting under their own powers" and "there exists things which
inherently possess being" (e.g., the soul in Christian theology).28 In
modern social theory, the self-action perspective is expressed in argu-
ments about the existence of the will and methodological individualism.
Within IR theory, liberal and rational choice approaches assume that
human beings and states act rationally to maximize utility,29 whereas
social identity theorists believe that social status is the main behavioral
driver.3o We also find the self-action perspective in norm-following
2S Elias, quoted in ibid., 283.
26 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy IsWhat States Make of It: The Social Construction
of Power Politics," Intemational Organization, 46(2),1992,402.
27 For example, Roxanne L. Doty, "Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-
Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory," European Journal
of IIttemational Relations, 3(3),1997; Jonathan D. Wadley, "Gendering the
State: Perforrnativity and Protection in International Security," in
Laura Sjoberg, ed., Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives
(London: Routledge, 2010),44.
28 Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology," 283.
29 For example, Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal
Theory of International Politics," International Organization, 51(4), 1997.
30 For example, Jonathan Mercer, IIAnarchy and Identity," International
Orgmtization, 49(2),1995; Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair
lain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, "Identity as a Variable," Perspectives on
Politics, 4(4), 2006.
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individuals or states (pursuing internalized norms).3] More holistic,
structuralist or system-oriented theories seek to avoid assumptions
about motives (e.g., Durkheim or Waltz) but assume the existence of
the phenomenon they seek to study, that is, society (Durkheim) or the
state system (Waltz). From a structuralist realist perspective, diplomacy
is close to irrelevant because of the "irreducible" security dilemma.32
Scholars in the defensive realist camp of structural realism are typically
less pessimistic, because they believe that certain forms of soft-line diplo-
macy can mitigate, although not eliminate, the security dilemma.33 It is
perhaps also in the substantialist approaches that Humes's legacy is most
apparent in IR theory: We cannot observe the act of causation; we can
only observe that the motion of the first billiard ball is followed by the
motion of the second billiard ball. And so we infer causation. Diplomacy
then becomes the mechanisms of states bumping into each other.
Inter-action: diplomacy as reciprocal signaling
Following inter-action theory, the relevant action takes place among
the entities themselves. At first sight, the inter-action version of sub-
stantialism resembles relationalism and allocates a greater role for
diplomacy. However, things in inter-action are "in causal intercon-
nection" against one another. 34 Thus, entities remain fixed and
unchanging throughout such interaction, each independent of the
existence of the others. This is where Jervis's foreign policy signals fit
in. 3S The inter~actionist approach is also detectible in diplomatic
language itself: deep-rooted expressions such as "normalizing" or
"severing" diplomatic ties; the former is a signaling device for
approval or recognition, while the latter sends strong signals of dis-
satisfaction without necessarily any military intentions.36
31 See James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A
Skeptical View," Handbook of International Relations, 2002, 58.
32 See also Iver B. Neumann, Chapter 5, this volume.
33 Charles Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, 50, 1997.
34 Emirbayet, "Manifesto fot a Relational Sociology," 285.
3S Jervis, "Cooperation undet the Security Dilemma." For a relational view of the
security dilemma, see Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Secllrity
Dilemma (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).
36 Geoff Berridge, Talking to the Enemy - How States Without ..Diplomatic
Relations" Communicate (London: St. Martin's Ptess, 1994),7. The language
of diplomacy is rife with references to ongoing production and reproduction of a
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The inter-action perspective can also be found in constructivism's
symbolic interactionist roots. As Copeland writes in a (critical) review
of Wendt, "each actor's conception of self (its interests and identity) is a
product of the others' diplomatic gestures. ,,37 While Wendt reinforced
a focus on state interactions, he bracketed off diplomatic and domestic
processes.38 Accordingly, diplomacy became understood as a system of
reciprocal signaling that affected state identities and interests.
Liberals in the interdependence tradition tend to replace the signal-
ing with a cobweb, thereby giving diplomacy a greater role.39 But this
complex diplomatic network of negotiation is not in and of itself in
need of theorizing; instead, it is the interests of the states that are in
focus, together with levels of trust, econo'mic independence, and so on.
Globalization and "soft power" scholars come closer to a relational
approach, by focusing on the interrelated and connected nature of
world politics. Yet substantia list assumptions sneak in. For instance,
Nye argues the £ella "iAg;
A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other
countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example,
aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness ... This aspect of power -
getting others to want what you want - I call soft power. It co-opts people
rather than coerces them.40
Soft power clearly is about relations, including diplomatic relations,
yet, "values," "models," "prosperity," or "openness" are possessed or
represented by the state, according to Nye. None of this includes
relations of mutuality or intersubjectivity, and they are seldom put
specifically at work in a concrete analysis.
However, in the past two. decades, the "new diplomacy" literature
has brought attention to the increasing involvement of NGOs, citizens,
and private companies in diplomatic negotiations. Diplomatic scholars
mediated internatiomilorder. SeeRebeccaAdler-Nissen,"Diplomacyas
ImpressionManagement:StrategicFace-Workand Post-Colonial
Embarr~ssment," CIPSS Working Paper Series, 38, Center for International
Peaceand SecurityStudies(Montreal:McGillUniversity,2012).
37 DaleC. Copeland, "The ConstructivistChallengeto StructuralRealism:A
ReviewEssay," ]"ternational Security, 25(2), 2000, 188.
38 Ibid., 212.
39 ChristerJonssonandMartinHall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndmills:Palgrave
Macmillan,2005), 17.
40 Joseph S.Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (NewYork:
PublicAffairs,2004), 5.
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have identified changes in the relations between, for instance, new and
old forms of diplomacy, pointing to the role of companies and
NGOs,41 and have shown that in addition to bilateral and multilateral
forms of diplomacy, the "polylateral" (or non-state) form of diplomacy
has become more predominant.42 Moreover, diplomatic scholars have
discussed what causes these changes. Some have argued that the
changes in diplomatic practices can be explained by external factors
such as the end of the Cold War, globalization, shifts in the traditional
balance of world power, and regionalization.43 Alternatively, the
change may be termed as a form of "mutual adaption" of diplomacy
to new technological, cultural, and political contexts.44 Following this
approach, we can analyze change in specific interests and relative
power positions between official state representatives and their rela-
tions to multinational companies, NGOs and multilateral arenas, but it
is less clear whether and how diplomacy as such is also changing. More
radically, in terms of transformation, Sharp concludes that "public
diplomacy is merely the latest of a series of waves seeking to transform
diplomacy and to point us to a world which will not need it. ,,45
However, as the editors note, much of the new diplomacy literature
remains actor-centric, reflecting more an inter-actionist view of the
world. This makes it blind to the processes that produce changes in
diplomatic practice.46
In sum, in its self-action or inter-actionist versions, IR theory tends to
bracket diplomacy away or use particular interests or actors as proxies
for diplomacy. IR theory often searches for kicks of exogenous change
(since its units are usually left unchanging), leaving the change itself
unexplainable. The new diplomacy literature br.ings us closer to
41 Andrew F. Hocking and Brian Cooper, "Governments, Non-governmental
Organisations and the Re-calibration of Diplomacy," Global Society, 14(3),
2000.
42 Geoffrey Wiseman (1999), "'Polylateralism'" and New Modes of Global
Dialogue.~' Reprinted in Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhorne, eds.,
Diplomacy, Vol. III. Discussion Papers, No. 59, Leicester Diplomatic Studies
Programme, 36-57 (London: Sage, 2004).
43 Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman, cds., Diplomacy in a Globalizing World:
Theories mId Practices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
44 Sec Jan Melissen, ed., Innovation in Diplomatic Practice (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 1999).
4S Paul Sharp, "Diplomacy, Diplomatic Studies, and the ISA," 11ltemational
Studies Perspectives, 13,2011, 718.
46 Ole Jacob Sending, Chapter 9, this volume.
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diplomacy as a research object - and to the way it changes - but has
tended to fall back on inter-actional arguments, evaluating the inter-
action between state-based and non-state diplomacy. The next section
discusses how Emirbayer's alternative, what he calls a trans-action
perspective or relational social theory. This perspective is implicit in
the way in which this book understands diplomacy.
Relationalism: diplomacy as social entanglement
In relational theory, the terms or units derive their meaning, significance,
and identity from the (changing) functional roles they play within that
relation. Thus, the relationship is a dynamic unfolding process. Relations
become the primary unit of analysis (rather than the constituent elements
themselves). Contrary to self-action and inter-action perspectives, with
trans-action or relationalism, "systems of description and naming are
employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, without final attri-
bution to 'elements' or other presumptively detachable or independent
'entities,' 'essences,' or 'realities,' and without isolation of presumptively
detachable 'relations' from such detachable 'elements.',,47
Examples of this way of thinking can be found for instance in Marx's
understanding of class as a relational (not pre-given) phenomenon. The
bourgeoisie exists only in relation to the working class. Another exam-
ple is Bourdieu's field theory, which shows that social practices are
never isolated activities. A human practice, for instance playing golf,
cannot be understood in itself and as a practice for its own sake. People
may play golf because they like to do so, but playing golf also brings
"distinctive gains" (at least in the 1970s) in contrast to, for instance,
rugby.48 Relationalism can also be found in Cynthia Enloe's analysis of
diplomats' wives who appear as almost invisible women, but who help
promote the national interest abroad and are complicit in the global
injustices that produce hierarchies between the Third and the First
World.49 To analytically isolate the wives from our understanding of
(the male) diplomats is therefore problematic.
47 Dewey and Bentley, quoted in Emitbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational
Sociology," 286.
48 Pierre Bourdieu, "Sport and Social Class," Social Science Infonnation, 17(6),
1978,828.
4' Cynthia Enloe, Bana/las, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of
International Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press 1990).
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Similarly, this book has shown that diplomacy is not an isolated,
detached activity. 50 Tilly famously argued that "states make war and
war makes states.,,51 This book adds: so does diplomacy. More speci-
fically, diplomacy is co-constitutive of other practices. For example,
Barkawi shows that diplomacy and war cannot be separated as easily as
diplomatic scholars (and diplomats) suggest. The underlying rationale
of the diplomatic profession may be to facilitate orderly and peaceful
relations among states,5z but this is not necessarily done peacefully. As
Barkawi demonstrates, the a priori (substantialist) classification of war
and the juridical fiction of the state as a unitary actor hinder under-
standing its true nature, including the way war helps sustain a parti-
cular order. The Correlates of War project, which conducts
quantitative research into the causes of warfare since the 1960s, builds
on a classification of war that makes it possible to argue that the coup
against Guatemala's Arbenz in 1954 was not orchestrated by the
United States because "interstate war is defined as organized violence
between two sovereign states involving at least one thousand battle
deaths over the course of a year. ,,53The international administration of
war is a web of relations.54 In Hurd's chapter, it is argued that the
"essentially state-centric nature of diplomacy could conceivably
change if non-state actors become more central to public international
law. ,,55Similarly, Seabrooke identifies change in the sense that brokers
take over a number of diplomatic tasks. Importantly, but this remains
more obscure, this change of actors also implies a change in the nature
of diplomacy.56 Indeed, the diplomatic system cannot be defined by its
structure, but by "the conflicting relations, which maintain reproduce
and sometimes transform it. ,,57 These conflicting relations involve
soldiers, lawyers, religious groups, consultants, human right activists,
50 In many ways, the new diplomac; literature evokes this entanglement but steers
away.from an explicit theorization of it.
51 Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter
B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State
Back In (Cambridge: Camhridge University Press, 1985), 170.
52 James Mayall, "Introduction," in Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, The
Diplomatic Corps as all b,stit"tioll of Illtematiollal Society (New York:
Palgrave, 2007), 6.
53 Tarak Barkawi, Chapter 2, this volume. 54 Ibid.
ss Ian Hurd, Chapter 1, this volume.
56 Leonard Seabrooke, Chapter 7, this volume.
57 James Ocr Dcrian, 011 Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Westem Estrallgement
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
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citizens, and a range of other people. Diplomacy is deeply entangled
with other practices, and it is not separate from the states it helps
constitute. Consequently, the distinction between war and diplomacy
(which is so central to most theories of diplomacy) is problematic. This
brings us back to diplomatic studies' somewhat rosy account of diplo-
macy, which this book has begun to undermine.
Diplomacy beyond the mediation of estrangement
If diplomacy is as deeply entangled in world politics as this book
suggests, it raises the question of whether diplomacy can still be seen
as the mediation of estrangement, or if that notion risks concealing
more than it reveals. I understand mediation in Der Derian's abstract
way as the mediation of distinct identities,58 not as the concrete prac-
tice of third-party mediation between two or more conflicting parties in
terms of reconciliation that Neumann analyzes.59 This book, while
steering away from an explicit definition of diplomacy, adopts a med-
iation perspective on diplomacy, in insisting with Sharp that diplomacy
requires a "condition of separateness. ,,60 Diplomacy is about consti-
tuting and representing states as separate units.61 Indeed, a classic
argument in diplomatic theory (and in diplomatic self-understanding)
is that diplomats are essentially mediators. Previously, Neumann has
described diplomacy as a third culture, that is, a culture for mediation
between political entities with diverse cultures.62 Similarly, Sharp's
diplomatic theory of international relations insists on diplomacy
S. Ibid.
s, The starting point for Der Derian's genealogy is rhe terminology for alienation,
which was used first as a noun - the "other, II "another" or as a verb alienaTe,
which meant "to take away" or "to remove" something. Following Dec Derian,
necessarily ambiguous identities derive from the fact that the principle of uni-
versality (e.g. God, and economic and political rights) is estranged from rhe
beings and they have to "sharel' this notion also among onc another - which
necessarily leads to their alienation from one another. This means that they can
only recognize themselves or the others completely, if the principle of univers-
ality works. The diplomatic process arguably resembles the necessity of media-
tion between identities being left in the confusion about themselves and others,
in which constant cognition and recognition of the actors is in place at all times.
Iver B.Neumann, Chapter 5, this volume.
60 Paul Sharp, Diplomatic Theory orIntemational Relations (Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
61 Ole Jacob Sending, Chapter 9, this volume.
62 Neumann, "To Be a Diplomat."
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retammg separateness between entIties, individuals, cultures, and
states.63 For Hall and Jonsson, diplomacy is "a timeless, existential
phenomenon. ,,64 It is constitutive of any international society and at
the most abstract level, "diplomacy can be analyzed as the mediation
of universalism and particularism. ,,65Somewhat similarly, Sending and
Neumann argue that diplomacy "derives its strength in part from allow-
ing disagreement and contestation, also over the appropriate form and
content of diplomacy in different situations. ,,66 As Sending puts it,
"diplomacy constitutes a 'thin' inter-subjective space inasmuch as it
includes a minimum standard, or expectations, to 'keep on talking.",67
There is a great deal of ambivalence in these different calls for
acknowledging diplomacy as a mediating practice, from the English
School pluralists (Bull and Butterfield) to Constantinou's poststruc-
turalist calls for humanism in diplomacy.68 They range from prag-
matic system maintenance to more uncompromising attempts to
sustain "global hope" and "restore diplomacy as a virtue. ,,69 In
Lynch's account, religio-theological debates give a primary role to
diplomacy to mediate and manage the tension between universalist
(Christianity) and particularist authority claims (state sovereignty) as
well as between the Christian and the non-Christian other. 70 As she
demonstrates, the quest for universalism can be envisaged in very
different ways (from cosmopolitanism tp moral leadership or more
pessimistic forms of system maintaining), leading to different forms
of mediation (with different moral and political agendas) and conse-
quently different forms of diplomacy.
However, the scholarly defense of diplomacy's (postulated) ability to
mediate distinct ideas or world visions is problematic. While mediation
63 Sharp, Diplomatic Theory of International Relations.
64 Jonsson and Hall, Essence of Diplomacy, 3.
65 Ibid., 25. Emphasis in original.
66 Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B.Neumann, "Banking on Power: How Some
Practices in an International Organization Anchor Others," in Emanuel Adler
and Vincent Pouliot, cds., International Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), 236.
67 Ole Jacob Sending, this Chapter 9, volume.
68 Constantinou, "Between Statecraft and Humanism."
•• Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian, "Sustaining Global Hope:
Sovereignty, Power and the Transformation of Diplomacy," in Costas
M. Constantinou and James Der Derian, eds., Sustainable Diplomacies
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),3.
70 Cecelia Lynch, Chapter 6, this volume.
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may sound like a relational idea, it often conceals inter-actionist
assumptions, failing to fully access how diplomatic ideas and practices
of mediation themselves are productive of particular politics. While we
may agree with the importance of separation or respect for differences,
we need to dissect carefully the idea that diplomacy always equals
mediation of estrangement.
Ambassador White's account may serve again as illustration.
Whether the negotiations concerned regulation of sugar trade, imperi-
alism in North Africa, or agriculture, the Ambassador recalls that "a
certain amount of kindly hospitality was exceedingly efficacious in
greasing the wheels of the conference, as I have so often known it to
be in the settlement of other diplomatic questions.,,71 Ambassador
White represented the United States in the Algeciras Conference in
1906, addressing the Tangier crisis (Germany had attempted to prevent
France from establishing a protectorate over Morocco). The chief
concern of most delegates was that the conference should not break
up without an agreement, as this would possibly lead to war. The US
ambassador reports the following:
I felt at the time, and have felt ever since, that it was owing to the perpetual
exchange of views which rook place day after day between the delegates
outside the conference, and consequently, informally, and to the agreeable
and intimate personal relations which could hardly fail to be established
between a number of men of the world meeting all day long for three months,
that all friction at the formal sessions was avoided, in spite of an amount of
tension in the atmosphere prevalent almost to the end, and very difficult to
realize by anyone who was not present.72
For the diplomat, "substance" is important, but in the end "the perpe-
tual exchange of views" is crucial. "Greasing the wheels" is still a fitting
metaphor for how diplomats think of their job. This reflects the
7' Whiteet aI., "The Organizationand Procedureof theThird Hague
Conference," 182, emphasisadded.The focuson greasingthe wheelshelps
explain conflicts between line ministries and foreign ministries that disagree on
whether "relations to foreign powers" arc important, or whether "substance"
regarding agriculture, environment, energy - or even security and defense - is
more important. ThomasNowotny,Diplomacy alld Global Govemallce: The
Diplomatic Service ill allAge of Worldwide Illterdepelldellce,. (NewBrunswick,
NJ: Transaction Publishers,2012).
For diplomats, nothing is more important than process.
72 White et aI., "The Organizationand Procedureof theThird Hague
Conference," 183-184.
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diplomat's own understandings, her "folk relationalism," but it does
not necessarily give us the full account of diplomacy's entanglement.
While "diplomatic studies are closer to their subject - that is, diplo-
matic practice - than some IR students see as acceptable,,,73 this.close-,
'pess shoul4.lead diplomatic scholars to "go native."
The practical knowledge of how to do diplomacy does have its own
logic that "cannot be reduced to that of theoretical knowledge; that, in
a sense, agents know the social world better than the theoreticians.,,74
However, the scientist's work consists in making explicit this practical
knowledge, in accordance with its own articulations?5 Indeed, while
diplomats may continue to think of themselves as system maintainers
concentrating on "being within target," this book effectively shows
that there is more to diplomacy than the mediation of estrangement
(and that mediation has several meanings). The next two sections
discuss the broader consequences of these findings, the problems that
come with adopting a folk relationalist approach, and the risks of
uncritically overtaking the diplomatic self-understanding as mediator.
Diplomacy from system maintenance to governance
The first limit of the relational approach to diplomacy advanced in this
book is that while it successfully shows diplomacy's move to govern-
ance, it has difficulty analyzing the way in which diplomats become
policy makers. On the one hand, the chapters in this volume demon-
strate that the sharp distinctions between diplomacy as representation
and governing become untenable when adopting a relational approach.
On'the other hand, they.eafti.dra~ out all the implications because they
insist that diplomacy (still) has to do with mediation between distinct
identities or states.
For instance, several of the contributors to this volume show that
diplomacy does not just involve representation of particular interests
but also the construction of a more integrated international political
order. If multilateralism has become the dominant form of diplomacy,
then diplomacy - even when performed as representation - turns into a
73 Sharp, "Diplomacy, Diplomatic Studies, and the ISA," 723.
74 Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Chamboredon, Jean-Claude Passeron, and
Beate Krais, eds., The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries
(Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991),252.
75 Ibid.
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form of governance. This is perhaps most evident in Pouliot's account of
multilateral "group diplomacy" or PRIO cliques. Pouliot (and several
other contributors to this book) approach diplomacy sociologically,
identifying strategic moves in a Bourdieusian sense. Consequently,
when Pouliot talks about how "multilateral diplomacy involves addres-
sing multiples audiences simultaneously,,,76 he also sh9wS the socio-
logical impossibility of a sharp distinction between representation and
governance. A great deal of "information asymmetry" exists in multi-
lateral arenas that have grown increasingly complex and technical. The
multilateral scene is secluded from home capitals, and yet it still features
diplomats promoting national interests. In the ED, this turns into a form
of late sovereign diplomacy?7 The practice of "joining the consensus"
that Pouliot analyzes is not entirely the same as the mediation "that
allow[s] life to go on when major differences persist.,,78 Instead, perma-
nent representatives in different multilateral venues "develop a stake in
the success of multilateral ism itself, they,seek to help their partners in
trouble, and they contribute to the collective effort at compromise." 79
This form of diplomacy, while it involves "keep on talking" transcends
national representation. It is in itself a form of global governance. In her
analysis of the Concert of Europe and the effect of forum talks - that is,
repeated face-to-face diplomacy - Mitzen concludes that even a world
state requires a "diplomatic moment.,,80 This might have been the case
in the nineteenth century, but is it still the case?
Seabrooke begins to answer that question in his analysis of the out-
sourcing of diplomacy from governments, NGOs, and las to private
actors. He distinguishes between traditional diplomatic mediation and
brokering, the later involving market logics and the creation of new
information.81 Seabrooke's distinction hinges on the assumption that
traditional diplomats are mediators who do not "actively create new
information problems at the national and international levels. ,,82
Following this argument, consultancy groups such as Independent
Diplomat may increase the heterogeneity of diplomatic actors, but
76 Vincent Pouliot, Chapter 3, this volume.
77 Rebecca Adler-Nissen "Late Sovereign Diplomacy," The Hague Journal of
Diplomacy, 4(2), 2009.
78 COllstantinou, "Between Statecraft and Humanism/' 158.
79 Vincent Pouliot, Chapter 3, this volume.
00 Jennifer Mitzen, Chapter 4, this volume.
81 Leonard Seabrooke, Chapter 7, this volume. 82 Ibid.
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not necessarily change diplomacy as a practice of representation and
mediation (because arguably that's what diplomats do). Seabrooke
concludes that outsourcing can help keep politically sensitive topics
secret.83 Indeed, outsourcing provides a perfect way of avoiding
domestic scrutiny and legal responsibility.84 It also makes it possible
for diplomats to enter into a tricky game to simultaneously allow
international cooperation and communicate a sense of sovereignty to
the domestic audience. Diplomacy and diplomats are deeply involved
in everything from humanitarian work to economic consultancy.
Hurd shows how international law and foreign policy are mutually
constitutive: legal resources exist by virtue of being used by states to
justify their policies, and state poliCies depend on a legal justification.85
This view of international law as a political and strategic product,
which shapes future negotiations (rather than an ordered system), has
shaped insights in a range of academic fields, including postcolonial
and development studies86 and historical international relations.87
However, diplomatic scholars have hitherto not shared such critical
views of international law and governance. Perhaps they uncritically
accept the diplomatic self-narrative: diplomats "grease the wheels"
without ever becoming greasy themselves.
Neumann notes that "diplomacy is about the formulation and pur-
suit of national interests, and it is about systems maintenance. ,,88Yet,
as Neumann and the other contributors show, the pursuit of national
interests is more complicated than IR usually admits. But so is the
international system that diplomats help maintain. It is also not a
sta ble, unchanging system. In fact, system maintenance has evolved,
partly under the radar of public attention, to governance. Diplomacy is
still focused on living together in difference, but this life together - in its
83 Ibid.
8' Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Introduction to
Sovereignty Games," in Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen, eds., Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalizing State Sovereignty in
Europe and Beyond (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
85 Ian Hurd, Chapter 1, this volume.
S. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Intemational Law from Below: Development, Social
Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011).
87 Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, cds., Historical Sociology of
Intemational RelatiOlls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
ss Iver1'leumann, Chapter 5, this volume.
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multilateral and networked forms - has become increasingly demand-
ing for all parties involved. According to Sharp, the modern diplomat
moves away from representing the notion of a sovereign state toward
engineering new international institutions.89 As a consequence, "repre-
sentation - of sovereigns, interests, or ideas - has been replaced by
metaphors of constructing and building by which issues were to be
managed and problems was to be solved. ,,90 .
This leaves us with a question: who become the losers in this strug-
gle? What ideas, projects, and groups are marginalized when diplomats
engage in forum talks, build new institutions, outsource, and engage in
military diplomacy? In demonstrating diplomats' ability to not just
represent but also produce world politics, this book has been more
silent on those that diplomats get to govern, from Iranian civilians to
HIV-positive homosexuals in Africa. Moreover, it has not addressed
situations where diplomacy is excluded, silenced, or disempowered in
world politics (beyond when it is strategically outsourced or when
diplomatic tasks are shared with others). Yet, given the potential of
the relational approach to address exactly such processes, this is a task
that needs to be taken up in future studies. Exploring the non-
diplomatic blank spots on the map will be crucial to our understanding
of the diplomatic production of world politics.
Diplomacy and power: just greasing the wheels?
The second challenge to the relational approach adopted in this book
concerns the way in which questions of power and responsibility
become obscure. 91 To see how this plays out, let us return to the
89 Sharp, "Who Needs Diplomats?"; Kelley observes a move from "diplomacy as
an institution".to "diplomacy as a behavior"; see John Robert Kelley, "The New
Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution. Dil"6A.8ej & Sr8t~," Diplomacy &
Statecraft, 21(2), 2010, 288.
90 Sharp in an earlier piece also called "Who Needs Diplomats" writes about the
dilemma of diplomats being I 00 percent true to the sending state or diplomats
being "ambitious internationalists" who act so detached from the state that their
action is not authoritative for their se-nding state anymore; see Paul Sharp, "Who
Needs Diplomats? The Prohlems of Diplomatic Representation," l"ternational
Journal, 52(4),1997,610.
91 For another version of this argument about power and diplomatic studies, see
Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Just Greasing the Wheels? Mediating Difference or the
Evasion of Power and Responsibility in Diplomacy," The Hague Journal of
Diplomacy, 10(2), 2015.
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conversation with my MFA colleague about the gap between theory
and practice. What did my colleague mean with "being within target"?
It is a way of saying that the foreign service is merely the skilled
interpreter of a gut feeling, diplomats try to "sense" or "embody" the
national interest. As Sending notes, whereas diplomats simply "manage
frictions" as professional strangers, "humanitarjans can be said to
share a substantive commitment that cuts across territorial units";
they act as professional friends.92 In other words, diplomats are mes-
sengers, but the substance is defined somewhere else and by someone
else (the minister, the line ministry, or an external consultant).
However, this argument is based on a fiction of a substantive
national interest that can be identified and possessed. This fiction, of
course, is necessary for most forms of diplomatic negotiations, but it
does not always have the kind of vitalism or societal backing that most
IR theories implicitly assume. Much of what is promoted as "national
interests" is never (and has never been) discussed in parliamentary
assemblies or among government ministers as the "information asym-
metry" that Pouliot identifies also reveals. Nonetheless, even when they
are deeply implicated in global governanceprojects, diplomats still pass
as messengers.
This self-understanding as mediator and messenger - rather than
manager and policy producer - can have almost perverse effects. I recall
a discussion in the Danish MFA on the ED's response to the refugee
crisis following the international intervention in Libya in March 201l.
I was working in the MFA when theArab Spring erupted. (It was not
called" Arab Spring" internally in the ministry because everybody was
aware of the important differences between the processes in the North
African countries). Whereas the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and
Integration Affairs called for a leview of visa possibilities for selected
groups of refugees from Libya, the MFA concentrated on finding a
position that could balance domestic concerns and the median position
among the ED member states - our partners.
When I asked for a clarification of the MFA's position on the refugee
crisis, the response from my superior was that "we follow governmen-
tal policy." But the governmental policy had yet to be defined, and the
MFA was a party to the negotiations on how to handle the refugee
situation. In the end, the Danish foreign minister was equipped with the
92 Ole Jacob Sending, Chapter 9, this volume.
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following speech notes for the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting:
"We support that the general visa dialogue continues with Southern
neighbours. Still too early to consider negotiations on visa facilita-
tion and visa liberalization." So we would just go with the flow. This
is illustrative of what Neumann identifies as how "system maintai-
ners experience themselves as minor players. ,,93'lt is, hpwever, also a
very comfortable position because one can pretend that one is not
taking sides.
Yet, every MFA across the world has strategic departments and
policy offices handling everything from the Middle East to develop-
ment policies or international law and human rights. Over the years,
these MFA offices and departments hav:e developed their own takes on
these issues that they deal with on a routine basis. For instance, it is
likely that every MFA in the world has its own position (and institu-
tional memory) on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Of course, MFAs do
produce policy. However, the way that scholars describe diplomacy, it
is always about the process and bargaining tactics, but seldom about
the production of ideas and policies. This book has begun addressing
the ideological and practical work that goes into the diplomatic making
of world politics and the engineering of new international institutions,
using terms such as "collective intentionality," "commitment," "pure
love-ethics," and "the international administration of war."
More broadly, then, the implication of the relational approach
adopted in this book is that diplomacy cannot keep the innocence or
detachment that some of its practitioners (and theorists) would want it
to keep. This book has problematized the understanding of diplomacy
as a third culture. Diplomats contribute to defense planning and orga-
nization,94 war making,95 humanitarianism,96 conflict management
and mediation,97 polity building and multilateral governance,98 inter-
national law making,99 and economic reordering.lOo Diplomacy is
deeply entangled in the world it helps constitute. On the one hand, as
several contributors show, it is becoming militarized to the degree that
93 Iver Neumann, Chapter 5, this volume.
94 Krieger, Souma, and Nexon, Chapter 8, this volume.
95 Tarak Barkawi, Chapter 2, rhis volume.
9. Ole Jacob Sending, Chapter 9, this volume.
97 rver Neumann, Chapter 5, this volume.
98 Vincent Pouliot, Chapter 3, and Jennifer Mitzen, Chapter 4, this volume.
99 Ian Hurd, Chapter 1, this volume.
100 Leonard Seabrooke, Chapter 7, this volume.
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it becomes absurd to define it as the resolution of conflict by peaceful
means. On the other hand, "when conflict is diplomatized, it changes
the conflict, but it also changes diplomacy."lol
The editors note: "As far as authority is concerned, what sets diplo-
mats apart from other types of actors is not thatthey exclusively engage
in representation, but that they claim - usually with success - jurisdic-
tional control over it." 102 In other words, diplomats have the ability to
officially represent - and act on behalf of - a state or an organization or
institution of some sort. However, as we also learn, .this is only part of
the story. Diplomats keep the conversation going, but in doing so they
also help .shape it. What makes diplomacy particular is not just that it
focuses on formal representation, but that it sees itself as responsible
for managing relations, yet often sneaks away from responsibility for
the content of these relations. It is now time that the power-diplomacy
nexus is explored in more depth/03 and this requires further research.
If diplomacy is as deeply implicated in the making of world politics as
this volume suggests, it not only questions IR theoretical understand-
ings of what drives international relations, but it also challenges the
idea that foreign policy is decided by (more or less democratically
accountable) governments. So how is the'diplomatic making of world
politics to be held accountable?
Adopting a relationalist view, the answer cannot be framed in terms
of a principal-agent logic -whereby accountability equals control with
diplomats depicted as power holders. A relational view of power
does not see power as a resource or a substance, one that different
individuals or states possess in varying quantities. Instead, power is
conceptualiz,ed as productive energy that simultaneously shapes and is
shaped by social interactions. To address the power involved in the
diplomatic making of world politics requires us to trace power in
practice, that is, the emergent power, which plays out as a never-
ending struggle for recognition as competent.104 Rather than seeking
to attribute power in a reified entity - an actor such as a state or
political leader- power can be studied by exploring the actual produc-
tion of world politics.
101 Iver Neumann, Chapter 5, this volume. 102 Introduction, this volume.
103 Sharp, "Diplomacy, Diplomatic Studies, and the ISA."
104 Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, "Power in Practice: Negotiating the
International Intervention in Libya," European Journal of International
Relations, 20(4), 2014, 889-911.
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Diplomats and mainstream IR theory have been mutually estranged.
Many diplomats find IR scholarship problematic because it presents
their job in abstract and reductionist terms. IR theory seldom takes
diplomatic knowledge and practice seriously. Diplomacy, according to
many realist and liberalist IR scholars, is doneby unitary, sometimes
even rational, states with more or less fixed national interests that
determine negotiations. Alternatively, constructivists. interpret diplo-
macy as inter-action with mutual signaling of values and identities.
Both the image of billiard balls bumping into one another and the
image of continuous signaling are far from how diplomats experience
world politics. Meanwhile, IR theorists complain about the anecdotal
character of diplomatic history and ambassadors' memoirs. Basically,
diplomatic self-narratives do not reflect the deeper mechanisms of
international relations. lOS This is where this volume provides a richer
view of how diplomacy works in practice, by snowing that diplomacy is
much more than the mediation of estrangement.
I have suggested that one of the reasons for the estrangement
between IR scholars and diplomats is that much of IR theory is sub-
stantialist, while diplomats work with a relational ontology. For the
diplomat, the primary unit of analysis is relations (not states) - what
I called the diplomatic folk relatlonalism. The analysis of diplomacy's
role in world politics has been hindered by a priori classifications of
diplomacy in state focused, actor-centric ways. Diplomats have been
interpreted as substantives that act, rather than nouns that come into
being.lo6 However, as Barkawi insists in his discussion of Iraq and the
war in Syria, we cannot think of "Iraq" as some kind of unitary actor
(of course this is true for all states). Instead, we need to recall the web of
relations sustaining the war in Syria, the international flows of money,
people, material, and arms. The association between peaceful means
and diplomacy is problematic. More generally, diplomacy is deeply
entangled; it is constantly reproduced and reproducing of other social
practices in world politics.
lOS See Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Diplomatic History and
International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing
Boundaries," I1,ternotional Security, 22(1),1997.
106 Ole Jacob Sending, Chapter 9, this volume.
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Uncritically taking on the relational ontology of diplomacy has at
least two major pitfalls. First is the risk of accepting the view that
diplomacy is a meta-relational practice of mediation. Indeed, if we
take the diplomats' own account at face value, diplomacy appears
almost empty - it is about mediation and representation, not govern-
ance. Arguably, others (line ministries, foreign powers, governments,
etc.) feed in with political content, but diplomats are not themselves
policy makers. A relational approach as the one sketched out in this
book should not stop at the analysis of the co-constitution of diplomacy
and other aspects of world politics. Further research should look at the
way in which responsibility disappears when. diplomacy turns into
governance. Deeply entangled in wars, treaty making, refugee crises,
and so on, diplomacy is much more than the mediation of estrange-
ment. We also need studies that look into the limits of diplomacy when
other international practices, peoples, or technologies manage to silence
or marginalize the diplomatic production of world politics.
Second, and related to the first, a relational approach should not
avoid the question of power. On the contrary, it should promote a
different way of assigning responsibility (today, it is usually with
governments, rarely with diplomats). The IR discipline is in need of
approaches that can address basic questions about power and influ-
ence. A relational approach, as the one proposed in this book, insists
that diplomacy's system-maintaining functions, the grease on the
wheels, is indeed greasy. Moving from units to relations thus involves
less attention to national win-sets and other forms of unhelpful reduc-
tionism and more attention to the actual making of world politics.
